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OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
Elaine Stites, Barbara Buchman, and Lauren Ball appeal the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment on their reverse race discrimination and retaliation claims brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act. We will 
affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its thorough opinion. 
I. 
Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts, and we do so 
in the light most favorable to Appellants. Appellants, who are Caucasian, were employed 
as inspectors by Alan Ritchey, Inc. (“ARI”), a company that, prior to closing all of its 
mail transport facilities, serviced mail transport equipment (“MTE”) pursuant to a 
contract with the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). Inspectors were required to sort 
through bins of MTE to check for damaged or defective products. To track how 
efficiently individual inspectors performed their work, ARI utilized a software program 
that calculated an individual inspector’s efficiency rating based on the number of items 
 3 
serviced by that inspector in a given time period.  
In 2006, in response to a steady decline in the volume of MTE arriving at its 
facility for servicing, ARI initiated a Reduction in Force (“RIF”), which resulted in the 
layoff of six employees, including Ball. In early 2007, as its revenues continued to 
plummet, ARI conducted a second RIF, this time laying off fifteen employees, including 
Buchman. In September 2007, Stites was terminated in accordance with ARI policy after 
failing to meet the minimum required weekly efficiency rating for the fourth time that 
year. In both RIFs, ARI conducted a “Reduction in Workforce Analysis,” which ranked 
employees based on the efficiency ratings, and eliminated those employees with the 
lowest ratings, regardless of their race. Each time, this methodology resulted in the 
termination of Asian and non-Asian employees; similarly, both Asian and non-Asian 
employees were retained in each RIF. Likewise, three weeks after Stites’ termination for 
low efficiency ratings, an Asian inspector was terminated for the identical reason.  
On January 27, 2009, Appellants filed suit accusing ARI of reverse race 
discrimination and retaliation. On January 10, 2011, the District Court granted ARI’s 
motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.  
II.
1
 
A. Discrimination 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Appellants’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary 
review over a grant of summary judgment and consider the facts in a light most favorable 
to Appellants.  Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 405 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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Appellants claim that their terminations resulted from reverse race discrimination. 
In analyzing such claims, we employ the familiar burden shifting analysis set forth by the 
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Because the 
parties do not dispute that Appellants have established a prima facie case of 
discrimination or that ARI has articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating 
them—namely, that it applied objective, performance-based efficiency ratings—our 
analysis turns solely on whether Appellants have overcome the “difficult burden” of 
proving pretext. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994). We hold that they 
have not.  
To establish pretext, Appellants must “point to some evidence . . . from which a 
fact finder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate 
reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a 
motivating . . . cause of the employer’s action.” Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 165-
66 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, Appellants admit that they do not—and cannot—dispute the 
accuracy of ARI’s employee efficiency scores. Nor do they dispute that ARI laid off only 
those employees with the lowest efficiency scores or that these layoffs affected both 
Asian and non-Asian employees. And finally, although Appellants allege that Asian 
employees were given easier work, thereby “making it impossible for non-Asians to score 
as well as Asians,” they admit that several non-Asian inspectors maintained efficiency 
scores better than many—if not most—of the Asian inspectors. We therefore hold that 
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Appellants have not shown such “contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate 
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of 
credence.” Id. at 166 (citation omitted). Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate. 
B. Retaliation 
Appellants also allege that ARI retaliated against them for complaining about the 
alleged preferential treatment of Asian workers. To prevail on a retaliation claim, a 
plaintiff must prove that “(1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer took a 
materially adverse action against her, and (3) there was a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the employer’s action.” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. 
Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 231 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the only evidence presented by Appellants 
to show a “causal connection” is the claimed temporal proximity between their 
complaints and their terminations. Although temporal proximity alone may be sufficient 
to create an inference of causality in some cases, it must be “unusually suggestive” to do 
so. Id. at 232. The record here, however, shows that Appellants complained numerous 
times over the course of several years of employment at ARI. Thus, far from being 
“unusually suggestive,” any proximity between Appellants’ final complaints and their 
terminations is merely coincidental. Consequently, summary judgment for ARI again was 
appropriate. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
 
 I agree with my colleagues that Appellants’ retaliation claims fail at summary 
judgment.  I disagree, however, that Appellants’ discrimination claims fail for want of 
pretext under Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Before they were laid off, Appellants complained to management that Asian 
unloaders favored Asian inspectors in the distribution of work.  Supervisor Arlene 
Yorgey validated these complaints, stating:  “yes, I do know that . . . you’re not getting 
the work because it’s going down . . . to the . . . Asian girls.”  Under our precedents, an 
employer’s reliance on objective criteria tainted by discrimination or inequality evidences 
pretext.  See, e.g., Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 319–21 (3d 
Cir. 2000); Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 994–95 (3d Cir. 1997).  In addition, 
ARI expressed racial bias
1
 and hired employees immediately before and after the 2006 
and 2007 RIFs.
2
  Finally, the fact that some Caucasians survived ARI’s layoffs and some 
Asians did not is not dispositive, see, e.g., Goosby, 228 F.3d at 321; Iadimarco v. 
Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 165 (3d Cir. 1999), particularly where, as here, ARI eliminated all 
but six or seven Caucasian processing employees in just two years. 
For these reasons, I would give Appellants their day in court. 
                                              
 
1
 Appellants and former co-workers testified that two supervisors said Asians 
work better, work faster, complain less, and do not call in sick as often as Caucasians. 
 
 
2
 ARI hired three inspectors two months after the 2006 RIF, converted four 
temporary employees to full-time status just three days before the 2007 RIF, and hired 
processing employees in the months following the 2007 RIF.   
 
